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The history of scientific inquiries into reproductive processes, in particular the his-
tory of the concept of reproduction, has gained much interest during the last dec-
ades within the history and philosophy of the life sciences. Against the backdrop 
of the developments of reproductive technologies, genomics and synthetic biol-
ogy since the mid-twentieth century – i.e. technoscientific approaches that aim at 
understanding and modifying generative and regenerative processes of organisms of 
all kinds – historicizing the notions of “heredity,” “reproduction” and “organism,” 
including the practices, apparatuses and infrastructures that have shaped them, is a 
timely endeavor.1 In particular, it is important to adopt a longue durée perspective 
in order to prevent oversimplistic “claims about modern innovations … based on 
flawed or foreshortened assumptions about the pre-modern” (Hopwood et al. 2018: 
13). Thereby, it is crucial to acknowledge that any attempt to reconstruct genealo-
gies, historical beginnings, turning points or epistemic shifts can only be written 
in retrospect and that historical evidence always depends on the situated knowl-
edges of the present that shape underlying periodizations. Histories of science, as 
Joan Steigerwald puts it with reference to Georges Canguilhem’s notion of histori-
cal recurrence, “are inevitably informed by our present preoccupations – by extant 
histories of place and time, by present scientific discourses and epistemic commit-
ments and by ongoing critical analyses of the project of science” (Steigerwald 2019: 
13). This means that any history of reproduction is a history of the present in which 
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it figures as a central technoscientific and biopolitical concept.2 So even if recent 
developments “can be traced back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in 
Western Europe” (Stephanson et  al. 2015: xvii), adopting a genealogical perspec-
tive seems to be much more promising than building on linear progressivist notions 
of history. Instead of searching for “origins,” clear episteme shifts or clearly defined 
epochs, a genealogical perspective focuses on interrelations of multiple, dispersed, 
sometimes even contradictory developments. François Jacob’s thesis of a “big shift 
from generation to reproduction” thus certainly needs “enrichment and re-examina-
tion” (Hopwood et al. 2018: 10). As Nick Hopwood argues in his exploration of the 
historical-semantic development of the notions of “generation” and “reproduction,” 
what is needed is “a larger-scale map of practices, concepts and word usage, espe-
cially for the long nineteenth century” (2018: 304).
Against this backdrop, the aim of this topical collection is to contribute to a recur-
rent genealogy of reproduction by focusing on the decades around 1800 and the 
various articulations of “reproduction” within the discursive field of German Natur-
philosophie.3 Thereby the topical collection engages with ongoing research and dis-
putes over the significance of Naturphilosophie for the history and philosophy of the 
life sciences. By focusing on the intersections of poetic, mythological, speculative 
and empirical knowledge claims, the contributions in this topical collection reveal 
the epistemic complexity and heterogeneity of the discursive field of Naturphiloso-
phie that was shaped by different, albeit converging approaches. In particular, they 
place specific emphasis on the various articulations of sex differences. In contrast 
to analyses that have focused only on the emergence of a binary model of sex dif-
ferences and the central status of notions of dualism and polarity, this topical col-
lection shows that conceptualizations of reproduction were also shaped by notions 
of asexuality androgynity or a third sex, i.e. by multiple understandings of sex and 
sexual differentiation. Indeed, sex differences were not only a politically charged 
issue. The disputes over the question of the extent to which “reproduction” needs to 
be understood as a process that involves two different living beings instead of a pro-
cess through which “active matter” regenerates itself were of central epistemologi-
cal importance because they addressed the question of how to understand organic 
3 As Canguilhem stresses, the genealogy of scientific concepts focuses on discontinuity instead of con-
struing linear developments (Canguilhem 1968). Foucault has built on this and his understanding of 
recurrence in the Archaeology of Knowlege (1969) differs significantly from his earlier idea of episteme 
shifts. “Recurrent distributions reveal several pasts, several forms of connexion, several hierarchies of 
importance, several networks of determination, several teleologies, for one and the same science, as its 
present undergoes change” (Foucault, quoted in Steigewald 2019: 13). The concept of “recurrence” was 
first introduced by Bachelard, who claimed that, in the words of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, the sciences 
“constantly trangress themselves but remain recursively, in the sense of a historical linkage, related to 
their inventory of problems” (Rheinberger 2007: 45f., my translation).
2 As Nick Hopwood, Rebecca Flemming and Lauren Kassell highlight in the introduction to the volume 
Reproduction. Antiquity to the Present, “frameworks for the history of reproduction were built in encoun-
ters between critical political and intellectual agendas, particularly within feminism and pre-existing dis-
ciplines. Histories of medicine, demography, the family … supplied foundations, component parts and 
narratives to critique” (2018: 5).
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nature, or life – thus the very subject of “biology.” It seems that the process that 
Jacob has framed as transition “from generation to reproduction” involved a shift 
from “regeneration to reproduction,” which, too, was not a linear monolithic pro-
cess. In contrast, the analyses of this topical collection reveal that during the decades 
around 1800 and within the relatively small field of Naturphilosophie, a whole range 
of scientific and speculative accounts co-existed that dealt with the question of how 
regenerative processes – for which the polyp, Buffon’s organic molecules and the 
infusoria were emblematic – and sexual reproduction differ and relate to each other.
1  The “emergence” of Reproduction the Eighteenth Century
The term “reproduction” emerged in the disputes over epigenesis and preformation 
in the mid-eighteenth century.4 Although it was not used in a coherent way and thus 
did not acquire a fixed meaning, the increased usage of the term towards the end of 
the eighteenth century was part of a re-orientation of scientific curiosity that mani-
fested itself in a wide range of experimental explorations of generative processes 
and theoretical reflections. As Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger 
have pointed out in their seminal work on the cultural history of heredity, the con-
ceptualization of organic reproduction “as ‘heredity’” (2007: 6) was constitutive 
for the emergence of what they call the “epistemic space of heredity” (ibid.: 8) in 
the nineteenth century. This process, they argue, relied on “an antecedent longue 
durée development in the course of which the reproduction of organic beings, in 
contrast to their mere production, became recognizable as a domain governed by 
laws of its own” (ibid.: 6). Certainly, this was not a merely conceptual development. 
In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Müller-Wille and Rhein-
berger stress, practices developed “by which the physical relations between organ-
isms, instituted by individual generative acts, were ascertained, either actively by 
experiment or passively by keeping records” (ibid.). Maupertuis and Buffon, who 
contributed much to the formation of the concept of reproduction, built their theo-
retical reflections and speculations on experiments in animal breeding, while Lor-
enzo Spallanzani inquired into the secrets of animal generation through experiments 
in artificial insemination.5 Thus when the neologism “reproduction” came into use 
among naturalists and philosophers in the late eighteenth century, this conceptual 
development was embedded in a broader process of scientific explorations of the 
generative processes of animals and humans.
In addition, the scientific disputes and inquiries into reproduction were closely 
entangled with the political, economic and socio-cultural transformations of the 
period. In particular, the European colonial expansion that led to an unprecedented 
mobilization of living beings and a respective accumulation of knowledge was a 
structural condition of the possibility to conceptualize supra-generational repro-
ductive processes. “Enclosing and mobilizing life on a global scale,” which made 
4 On the history of the different usages of the terms “generation” and “reproduction,” and the German 
words Fortpflanzung and Zeugung cf. Hopwood 2018, Holland (2014), Lettow (2014).
5 Cf. Terrall 2007 and Orland 2017.
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it possible to study the results of reproductive processes under the condition that 
living beings were separated from their endemic environments, “moved reproduc-
tion into the centre of the life sciences” (Müller-Wille 2015: 52).6 The botanical gar-
dens, which “offered a space to appropriate foreign nature through acclimatization, 
to explore the national fauna and flora for species that could serve as substitutes for 
expensive imports and to set standards for national production and trade” (ibid.: 48), 
played a crucial role in this context. In addition, developments in animal breeding 
led to the new technologies “to harness and control … natural processes for eco-
nomic and social reasons” (Stephanson 2015: 13).7
Speculations about improving the outcomes of reproduction were also geared 
towards humans in the context of population politics. “Population arithmetic and 
related probabilistic models of population began in the mid-seventeenth century” 
(Kreager 2018: 253), but they were “displaced by approaches prioritizing fertility 
from the turn of the eighteenth century” (ibid.: 254). Indeed, conceptualizing supra-
individual and supra-generational processes of reproduction made it possible to cal-
culate improvements on the level of populations. The very notion of a national popu-
lation as “a self-contained entity” that has “to replenish itself” (ibid.: 266), which 
emerged in the context of the formation of the modern state, was closely connected 
to these epistemic developments. In addition, the enormous interest in all aspects of 
procreation and generation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was 
fostered by transformations of gender, family and kinship relations, as well as by 
struggles over the intergenerational transmission of wealth and political privilege. 
As the old regime and the old patriarchal order, based on the authority of the father, 
vanished, new forms of kinship relations emerged. According to David Sabean and 
Simon Teuscher “a move from vertical to horizontal relationships, from a system 
distributing rights through patrilineal succession down the generations to a much 
more fluid set of networks constructed through marrying endogamously, mobilizing 
affinal kin and building obligation within ‘sibling archipelagos’” took place (Sabean 
et al. 2013: 13). While “all siblings were potentially equal” in this new system, it 
developed into “a new fraternal regime” (Engelstein 2017: 4). In this regime sisters 
and women more generally were addressed “as radically distinct” from men (ibid.: 
5). To sum up, scientific disputes and inquiries into reproduction were thus, on mul-
tiple levels, connected with socio-economic, political and cultural transformations 
that challenged traditional explanations and argumentations. Through their highly 
speculative aspects, conceptualizations of reproduction “touched not only a sense of 
6 Müller-Wille argues that Linné’s natural history was a main driver of this process and that the 
oppostion between his “static” taxonomic system and the temporalization of nature in the late eighteenth 
century does not hold.
7 “Early modern breeders aimed to arrest degeneration. Practical and cosmological frameworks encour-
aged breeding for the status quo. (…) The paradigm shifted when breeder’s objectives turned towards 
‘ideal types’ designed by humans” (Wilmot 2018: 398). According to Sara Wilmot, the new “apparatus 
of elite breeding … came into being in the eighteenth century” (ibid.). On articulations of human breed-
ing and the emerging race discourse cf. Lettow 2015.
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cosmological order” but also contributed to re-shaping social identities (Jordanova 
1999: 1).
Against this backdrop, the goal of this topical collection is to shed more light 
on the history of “reproduction” at the turn from the eighteenth to the nineteenth 
century by addressing the question of how “reproduction” was conceived and articu-
lated in Naturphilosophie. Thereby the collection contributes to filling a lacuna, as 
existing research on the relation between Naturphilosophie and the early life sci-
ences only touches on the issue of reproduction without further exploring its system-
atic relevance. Histories of reproduction, on the other hand, have not yet systemati-
cally explored the impact of Naturphilosophie.8 The fact that the naturphilosophic 
approaches should be studied in the context of the history of reproduction, however, 
is revealed by the prominent status that the concept acquires through the writings on 
philosophy of nature by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. For Schelling, nature 
– which he primarily conceives of as organic – is structured through an infinite pro-
cess of reproduction based on a dualism between the sexes.9 In the First Outline 
of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, Schelling starts from the assumption that 
Nature is “infinite … productive activity” (Schelling 1799/2004: 5). He argues that 
the endless productivity must be inhibited so that specific living entities, or “finite 
products” (ibid.) can appear. This, according to Schelling, presupposes the existence 
of two distinct sexes and every new product that results from the unification of the 
sexes again belongs to one of these. “Throughout the whole of Nature,” Schelling 
claims, “absolute sexlessness is nowhere demonstrable and an a priori regulative 
principle requires that sexual difference be taken as point of departure everywhere in 
organic nature” (ibid.: 36). Through the two sexes, Schelling concludes with respect 
to the fixity of species, the product “cannot reproduce anything but itself” (ibid.: 46) 
at a given stage of Nature. This means “it will reproduce itself not only as individ-
ual but simultaneously as genus to infinity (growth and procreation10)” (ibid.: 47). 
Schelling introduces his idea of the two sexes by re-articulating Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach’s notion of the formative drive. According to Schelling, the formative 
drive “splits in opposite directions” (ibid.: 6), i.e. a male one and a female one, while 
Blumenbach did not make such a distinction. Most of the subsequent naturphilo-
sophic theories that were formulated by authors such as Lorenz Oken, Henrik Stef-
fens, Franz von Baader, Gustav Carus and Hegel referred to Schelling’s sexualized 
understanding of the dynamics of nature and his idea of reproduction although they 
modified it in various ways. Goethe, whose essay on the Metamorphosis of Plants 
(1799) was an equally important text that was read and adapted in various ways in 
the context of Naturphilosophie, developed his understanding of reproduction and 
8 Peter Hanns Reill (2005) and Philippe Huneman (2006) however make clear that issues of generation, 
gender and sexuality play a strategic role in Naturphilosophie. For Reill the naturphilosophic explana-
tions of gender and sexuality express most clearly “the hierarchic and dynamic-static element” (2005: 
220) and Huneman stresses that “the peculiar status of sexuality is a general feature” (2006: 16) of 
Naturphilosophie.
9 Cf. also Alison Stone 2015, Lettow 2013.
10 Keith R. Peterson translates the German word “Zeugung” as “reproduction,” which is misleading 
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sex differences while working in close contact with Schelling. As the contribution of 
Stefani Engelstein shows, his account of these issues, however, clearly differs from 
Schelling’s. Certainly, German Naturphilosophie contributed significantly to con-
ceiving reproduction, in particular through shaping notions of sexual differentiation 
and impacted on the formation of the life sciences at the turn from the eighteenth to 
the nineteenth century.
2  Naturphilosophie and the History of the Life Sciences
From the mid-nineteenth century to the second half of the twentieth century, Natur-
philosophie had been regarded – with few exceptions11 – as a scientific anomaly by 
positivist standards. Indeed, in the years around 1800 contemporaries such as Carl 
Friedrich Kielmeyer already expressed critical views with respect to the scientific 
claims of Naturphilosophie. In a letter to Cuvier from December 1807, Kielmeyer 
“‘gladly agreed’ with Cuvier, that these investigations of natural knowledge, under-
taken primarily by younger persons, have, in Germany, produced more damage than 
benefits” (Reill 2005: 202).12 In addition, Hegel launched a harsh critique of Natur-
philosophie in the introduction to his own philosophy of nature. In the addition at 
the beginning of the introduction to the second part of the Encyclopaedia, we read 
that Naturphilosophie “made a chaotic mixture of crude empiricism and uncompre-
hended thoughts, of a purely capricious exercise of the imagination and the most 
commonplace way of reasoning by superficial analogy…” (Hegel 1970: 1). His criti-
cism that Naturphilosophie is shaped through a “peculiar relationship to natural sci-
ence” (ibid.: 2),13 however, did not prevent him from developing a philosophy of 
nature that deepened the epistemic gulf between philosophical speculation and the 
sciences (see Suzuki in this topical collection). From the mid-nineteenth century 
on, scientists such as Jakob Friedrich Fries and Hermann von Helmholtz then com-
pletely condemned Naturphilosophie as unscientific.14
11 In 1941, Alexander Gode-von Aesch published the book Natural Science in German Romanticism, 
in which he argued that science and literature “are to be regarded, not as separate, tangential fields of 
expression, but as two aspects, identical in physiognomy, of the general movement that marked Germa-
ny’s cultural life in the transition from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth century” (1941: 12).
12 Kielmeyer’s own relation to Naturphilosophie, however, is complex. His address On the Relations 
Between the Organic Forces from 1793 was enthusiastically received by the Naturphilosophs and Schell-
ing even claimed that with Kielmeyer “an entirely new epoch of natural history” had begun (quoted by 
Zammito 2018: 245). Zammito concludes that in the first years of the new century “Kielmeyer may well 
have begun to rue the impulses he had helped to set loose in life sciences, paleontology and philosophy 
of nature” (ibid.: 265).
13 “The category ‘science’ itself … is a relative historical novelty. In Europe’s various languages, the 
word took on its modern meaning only over the course of the nineteenth century. Before 1800, there was 
no standard collective term for the sciences of nature taken together” (Phillips 2012: 3). The German 
term Naturwissenschaft (natural science) had its first entry in the Brockhaus lexicon in 1824 (ibid.: 28).
14 The neo-Kantian turn in science and philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century in Ger-
man academia impacted greatly on the development of logical empricism in the twentieth century (Fried-
man et al. 2006) and on the respective strands in the history and philosophy of science that dominated 
these fields until the 1970s and partly continue to dominate.
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However, in contrast to neo-Kantian and “proto-positivistic” (Beiser 2006: 8) 
readings, the natural philosophies of German Idealism and the Romantic period 
were not shaped by speculations hostile towards science and empiricism, but devel-
oped through analyses and methodological reflections on the cutting-edge natural 
research of the period. “All crucial philosophers of the time thought about the rela-
tion of man to nature and the possibilities of knowledge about nature to an extent 
not regained up to now. In addition, even if not to the same extent, naturalists around 
1800 grappled directly with conceptions of Naturphilosophie” (von Engelhardt 
1976: 1). In order to understand this close and peculiar relation between philosophy 
and the emerging life sciences, it is important to note that philosophy, too, acquired 
a new meaning and status. “In the period between the French Revolution and the 
opening of the new University of Berlin in 1810 there was agitation throughout 
the German universities for promotion of philosophy from its traditional role as a 
‘lower’ preparatory faculty to that of a higher ‘scientific’ faculty on a par with law, 
medicine and theology” (Jardine 1996: 243). According to Nicholas Jardine, Natur-
philosophie was “perceived as offering natural history a rise in status from a mere 
appendage of the medical faculty to full membership alongside mathematics, philol-
ogy and physics in a higher philosophical faculty” (ibid.: 243f.). Probably the oppo-
site also holds, i.e. that through the engagement with the scientific debates of the 
day, philosophy received specific attention. Certainly, Naturphilosophie, which built 
on the scientific and philosophical debates on the specificity of the organic world 
and in particular on Kant’s reflections on teleology, must therefore be understood 
as an epistemic field that indeed played a “‘strategic role’ for the birth of modern 
biology” (Cimino 1997: 14). This conviction is shared by Dietrich von Engelhardt, 
who states that “the period of metaphysical contemplation of nature in the form of 
romantic natural science and speculative natural philosophy was of particular signif-
icance in the modern development of the natural and especially biological sciences” 
(1997: 174).15
In particular, Schelling’s critique of the epistemic restrictions regarding the possi-
bility of a “science” of the living that Kant had formulated in his Critique of Judge-
ment was decisive for the debates concerning the epistemological problems of “biol-
ogy”. Kant had claimed that such a science was impossible because the specificity 
of organic entities, i.e. growth, regeneration and reproduction, cannot be explained 
through mechanic laws while science, for Kant, was defined through mechanistic 
explanation. Organisms, Kant argued, are shaped through a teleological structure 
15 This also holds with regard to the institutional aspects. “Most leading figures in German Romantic 
science were tirelessly social. Henrik Steffens led the Natural Scientific Section of Breslau’s Silesian 
Society for the Culture of the Fatherland (Schlesische Gesellschaft für vaterländische Cultur). Carl 
Gustav Carus played a prominent role in the local scientific societies of his native Dresden. Lorenz 
Oken, famously, was the guiding force behind the Society of German Natural Researchers and Doc-
tors (Deutsche Gesellschaft der Naturforscher und Ärzte). His fellow Naturphilosoph Christian Nees 
von Esenbeck initiated an effort to revive the Leopoldina, the official academy of the now-defunct Holy 
Roman Empire” (Phillips 2012: 87).
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insofar as they are self-organized. In order to avoid physico-theological or anthropo-
morphic explanations, Kant added that this teleological structure was merely a “reg-
ulative” idea and did not involve a “constitutive” claim.16 Schelling deconstructed 
the distinction between the “constitutive” and the “regulative” in his philosophy of 
nature, which did not take the subject, the Fichtean ego, as its starting point but 
dynamic Nature. “Rather than attempting to ground the fundamental forces of nature 
in the basic activities of the transcendental ego, Schelling … insisted on placing 
their foundation in nature itself” (Beiser 2002: 529f.). This opened the way for natu-
ralists to conceive of organic nature and its specific dynamics as an object of scien-
tific inquiry and of “biology” as a science. Post-Kantian Naturphilosophie however 
was not a simple rejection of Kant’s epistemological turn but built on the unsolved 
questions of his philosophy and the “new space of thinking” that had been “opened 
by the third Critique” (Huneman 2006: 2).17
The significant role that Naturphilosophie played in the process of the forma-
tion of the life sciences has recently been reconstructed by John Zammito. His book 
The Gestation of German Biology. Philosophy and Physiology from Stahl to Schell-
ing (2018) is based on the critiques of the neo-Kantian bias in the history of sci-
ence and philosophy that have been formulated since the mid-1970s.18 A decisive 
attempt to understand the relation between Naturphilosophie and the life sciences 
was certainly Dietrich von Engelhard’s division of Naturphilosophie into “transcen-
dental,” “metaphysical” and “scientificated” Naturphilosophie (1979: 105), to which 
Timothy Lenoir referred when he distinguished between transcendental Naturphil-
osophie and speculative and metaphysical conceptions that “removed the boundaries 
of possible a priori knowledge” (Lenoir 1981: 113). In Lenoir’s view, the “Göttin-
gen School” of biology, whose members included Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, 
Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer, Alexander Humboldt and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, 
built on a “Kantian biological tradition.” Goethe, Lorenz Oken, Carl Gustav Carus, 
Schelling and Hegel, in contrast, denied, as Lenoir put it, “the claim basic to Kant’s 
philosophy of biology that the human faculty of understanding cannot be constitu-
tive of organic forms” (ibid.:149). However, Lenoir’s distinction has proven to be 
16 Indeed, this distinction gave rise to a wide range of interpretations and criticisms. “It might appear,” 
as Philipp Huneman puts it, “that in the end Kant was quite alone in insisting on the sharp distinction 
between regulative and constitutive and mainly for metaphysical reasons” (2006: 8).
17 Certainly, this does not mean, as Amanda Jo Goldstein criticizes, that Kant “discerned and concep-
tualized the organism as the special object of the then-emergent sciences of life” (Goldstein 2018: 4) 
and that he identified “the epistemological gounds of modern biology” (ibid.). Such a view completely 
neglects the post-Kantian re-articulations of his understandings of science, nature and organism as well 
as developments beyond the German context.
18 Cf. for example Andrew Cunningham, Nicholas Jardine (ed.): Romanticism and the Sciences. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. They state that “the past fifteen years have … seen a revival 
of scholarly interest and a series of reassessments” (1990: xix) of Romanticism.
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too schematic and has been criticized by authors such as Robert J. Richards (2002) 
and Frederick Beiser (2002 and 2006). As Beiser puts it: there is “only a distinc-
tion in degree and not in kind between Schelling, Hegel and Novalis on the one 
hand and Blumenbach, Kielmeyer and Humboldt on the other hand. Any qualita-
tive distinction underestimates not only Kant’s profound influence upon Naturphil-
osophie but also the deep tension between Kant’s regulative constraints and late 
eighteenth-century physiology. Even worse, it exaggerates the speculative and 
a priori dimension of Naturphilosophie, as if it had no concern with observation 
and experiment, while it downplays the metaphysical interests of those engaged in 
observation and experiment” (2006: 10). After all, Beiser emphasizes, “there was no 
clear distinction between philosophy and science in this period and … there was no 
such thing as a pure empirical science limited to only observation and experiment” 
(ibid.). In a similar way, Richards has claimed that “historiographic attitudes,” such 
as that of Lenoir, that “wish to shield the ‘real’ biologists of the period” from the 
“taint” of natural philosophy have “excised the heart of nineteenth-century biology” 
(2002: 2f.). He therefore pleas for a “reattachment” of early nineteenth-century biol-
ogy “to the thought and culture that animated it” (ibid.: 3). This insight is taken up 
in this topical collection by focusing on conceptualizations of reproduction.
3  Science and Imagination: Experiments, Analogies and the “New 
Mythology”
Recent publications on the interrelations of Naturphilosophie and Romanticism with 
the sciences of the day have stressed the relevance of experiments and reflections 
about technology in order to challenge idealist accounts and in particular the notion 
of organicism as an organizing intellectual principle. According to Jocelyn Holland, 
organicism is “perhaps the last of Romanticism’s unchallenged concepts” (2019: 30) 
that deserves reassessment. By analyzing the role of the lever in Romantic thought 
and Naturphilosophie, Holland questions the sharp distinction that has been drawn 
in intellectual history between mechanism and organicism. In fact, she shows that 
“the lever is deeply ingrained in early Romantic thinking, where its theory serves 
as a heuristic tool to model relationships between concepts, to describe processes 
of generation of both the individual and the universe and, more generally, as a way 
of addressing potential contradictions of philosophical thinking through the logic 
of sublation embodied by the lever in equilibrium” (ibid.). In a similar vein, Joan 
Steigerwald argues that “instrumental explorations of organic bodies expanded the 
domain of organic vitality and its boundary with the inorganic, confusing any clear 
delineation of the living and the nonliving” (2019: 39).
The contributions in this topical collection by Jocelyn Holland and Christine 
Lehleiter further explore the boundaries between the organic and the inorganic as 
well as the significance of experimental aspects of naturphilosophic thinking on 
reproduction. Holland explores how Johann Wilhelm Ritter’s reflections on rota-
tional movements that borrowed from the alchemical tradition and evoked geologi-
cal speculations “undermined polarity-based models of reproduction.” Lehleiter, in 
addition, shows how Goethe, in his adaptation of the Melusine mythos, implicitly 
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engaged with contemporary debates about reproduction, heredity and new breeding 
technologies. Their analyses also reveal the central role of speculation, mysticism 
and literary imagination. The same holds for Stefanie Engelstein’s exploration of 
Goethe’s and Schelling’s references to mythology, through which both authors artic-
ulate their understandings of sexual division as well as distinctions between science 
and art and for Marcio Suzuki’s analysis of Hegel’s philosophical re-articulation of 
Goethe’s idea of metamorphosis. Indeed, the contributions of this topical collection 
show that Naturphilosophie must be understood as a discursive field that has been 
shaped by heterogeneous but intersecting epistemic strategies geared towards scien-
tific, philosophical, literary, religious and mythological knowledge claims.
A standard reproach to Naturphilosophie that can be traced back to Hegel’s criti-
cism is that these diverse perspectives and knowledges have been artificially drawn 
together through analogical thinking. Analogies, according to Hegel, do not contrib-
ute to the discovery of truth. In contrast, he argues that analogies do “not permit an 
inference to be made” (Hegel 1977: 152) but result in assumptions about probabil-
ity only. In fact, this purely negative account of analogical thinking is questionable 
and the use of analogies, metaphors and comparisons has been widely discussed in 
contemporary philosophy of science. With regard to the “common ground between 
literature and science” that existed in the early nineteenth century prior to the devel-
opment of the so-called “two cultures,” Devin Griffiths has introduced the notion 
of “harmonic analogies” in order to explain the epistemic productivity of analo-
gies. “Analogies,” he argues, “give voice to patterns that have no name” (2016: 11) 
and thus play an important role in the process of discovering new problematics. In 
contrast to “formal analogies” through which “a previously understood pattern of 
relationships is applied to a new context,” harmonic analogies explore “a pattern 
between two different sets of relationships” (ibid.: 18). These harmonic analogies 
are highly creative because they “allow significant shared features to emerge through 
contact between two different domains placed in serial relation” (ibid.). However, 
with regard to the epistemic strategies of Naturphilosophie the question arises as 
to whether the problem is correctly framed when reducing it to the use of analo-
gies. In particular, it seems crucial to take into account – as several contributions to 
this topical collection do – the call for a “new mythology” that shaped these strate-
gies. As Manfred Frank has shown, the idea of a new mythology first emerged in 
the context of post-Enlightenment debates about the possible meaning of ancient 
mythologies in modernity. What was at stake in these debates was a critique of ana-
lytic rationality, although the “new” mythology was understood as a mythology of 
reason. This means that ít was by no means a plea for irrationalism, pure speculation 
or a return to theology but a “meta-critique of enlightened critique” (Frank 1982: 
188) based on a dialectical understanding of reason which asserts its own limita-
tions and legitimizes itself by providing its own epistemic and ethical foundations. 
Scientific rationality, in this context, was an issue of concern, so that the boundaries 
between science and art, in particular poetry, or between reason and imagination, 
were constantly negotiated and re-negotiated.
It is this amalgamation of different epistemic strategies through which Natur-
philosophie was constituted in the early nineteenth century that – despite later his-
toriography – contributed immensely to the development of biology. In contrast to 
1 3
Conceiving reproduction in German Naturphilosophie.… Page 11 of 15    49 
attempts that merely aim at re-integrating Naturphilosophie into the history of the 
life sciences and that highlight its impact on the scientific developments that have 
occurred from the nineteenth century onwards, it is of central importance to take 
seriously the interrelations of scientific, poetic, mythological, religious and philo-
sophical references. Re-integrating Naturphilosophie into the history of the life sci-
ences then means also to historicize the boundaries through which the epistemic 
object of the history of the life sciences has been shaped and to challenge the bound-
aries of this field of knowledge. Indeed, when history of science itself emerged as 
a distinct field in the twentieth century, it built on an understanding of science and 
scientific disciplines that is anachronistic with regard to the decades around 1800. 
Taking Naturphilosophie seriously thus means to scrutinize the historically contin-
gent relations between philosophy, science and history of science in order to estab-
lish new, productive perspectives on this complicated relationship. A central aspect 
in this respect is the nexus between “mythology” and reason, or the imaginative and 
cultural-symbolic excess of the sciences as they were constituted and separated from 
other modes of knowing during the nineteenth century. This excess is particularly 
powerful when it comes to scientific and technological explorations of “reproduc-
tion” and public disputes over the use of human stem cells, germ line experimenta-
tion or the invention of new artificial reproduction technologies (ART). Far from 
being results of “neutral” science, these endeavors are heavily charged with and 
evoke various biopolitical imaginaries and imaginations about what kinship, family 
and identity mean.
With regard to the imaginative aspects of science, interdisciplinary research on 
the intersections of science, literature and the arts has added important insights 
to the field of history and philosophy of the life sciences. Although, as Christine 
Lehleiter has stated, there have been “hesitations and delays in establishing and 
institutionalizing the field” (2016: 2), inquiries into the interrelations between litera-
ture and science have now flourished at least since the 1990s. These do not concern 
only the transposition of scientific problems and developments into literature or nar-
rative structures that shape scientific texts. In addition, research on “literature and 
science” has shown how porous the boundaries between the so-called “two cultures” 
have always been, certainly in the period around 1800. The significance of Goethe’s 
scientific writings, for example, had certainly been acknowledged for a long time 
and the idea that his notion of metamorphosis was of utmost theoretical importance 
for Schelling and subsequent Naturphilosophie is widely dicussed now.19 In addi-
tion, scholarly attention to his non-scientific writings, too, provides crucial insights 
into the history of the life sciences, as Lehleiter argues.
Some of the contributions in this topical collection are part of the field of “litera-
ture and science,” others are mainly indebted to the history of philosophy and his-
tory of science. Since the contributions all converge with regard to the authors they 
discuss and with regard to the topics of reproduction and sexual differentiation the 
19 Cf. Christine Lehleiter (2015) and Stefani Engelstein (2008). On the collaboration between Goethe 
and Schelling cf. Nassar (2010).
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collection provides an example of how these different disciplinary approaches can 
intersect.
In her contribution De-polarizing Reproduction: Two Cases from Naturphiloso-
phie, circa 1800, Jocelyn Holland scrutinizes how the Romantic physicist Johann 
Wilhelm Ritter connected the notion of reproduction to rotational movement. She 
analyzes how Ritter, who heavily builds on the alchemical tradition for conceiving 
generative capacities, complicates binary models of sex differences. Nonetheless 
Ritter, as Holland shows, also integrates contemporary scientific ideas about cen-
trifugal and gravitational forces and introduces the androgyne figure of a “third sex.” 
Stefani Engelstein also argues that the binary understanding of sexual reproduction 
that structures Schelling’s philosophy of nature was not the only theoretical option 
available. In particular, Schelling’s dualistic account clearly differed from Goethe’s 
more nuanced understanding of sexual reproduction. Engelstein’s analysis focuses 
on Goethe’s and Schelling’s references to “mythology” through which they negoti-
ate the relation between poetry and science or science and philosophy. Goethe’s atti-
tude towards sexuality, however, is more complex than Schelling’s in so far as sexual 
reproduction, for Goethe, only emerges at a certain stage of organic development 
but is not – as for Schelling – a metaphysical condition of organic development. 
So, while Goethe also conceives of non-sexualized modes of generativity, Schelling 
introduces a binary model that is at the same time hierarchic, as Engelstein shows in 
her exploration of Schelling’s theoretical engagement with mythology and his deval-
uation of the female. Gregory Rupik’s analysis of Goethe’s exposition of plants’ 
transformations in The Metamorphosis of Plants supports this conclusion. He shows 
how Goethe departed of from Linnaeus’ and Christian Wolff’s understandings of 
teleology and introduced an a-teleological understanding of propagation by build-
ing on insights that he found in Herder’s philosophy of nature. In particular, Rupik 
argues that Goethe conceived of nature as “active productivity” and of sexual propa-
gation as not being different in kind from the process of metamorphosis that shapes 
the plant through each moment of its life. So, despite Goethe’s close collaboration 
with Schelling and the deep impact that his notion of metamorphosis had on many 
Naturphilosphs, the way Goethe conceived of procreative and generative processes 
seems to be much less static. In addition, Christine Lehleiter’s analysis of Goethe’s 
adaptation of the myth of Melusine – a narrative which centers on the union between 
a male human and a supra-natural female – reveals that Goethe did not only engage 
with the contemporary scientific theories and disputes over growth, regeneration and 
reproduction and the status of sex differences within the realm of the organic. More-
over, Lehleiter analyzes how Goethe evaluated contemporary debates on heredity 
and breeding. In his alteration of the mythical narrative, Lehleiter argues, Goethe 
refers to contemporary scientific debates and new developments in animal hus-
bandry. Although Goethe, in his scientific writings, did not consider sexual repro-
duction as a driver of change or species transformation so that organic variation was 
clearly defined to the unchangeable boundaries of the species, Lehleiter shows that 
in his New Melusine, Goethe arrives at different conclusions. The story not only sug-
gests that “novelty beyond variation” is possible, but it can also be understood, as 
Lehleiter suggests, as an early reflection on biopolitical projects of human breed-
ing. Marcio Suzuki, in his chapter on Reproduction versus Metamorphosis: Hegel 
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and the Evolutionary Thinking of His Time finally reconstructs Hegel’s distinction 
between Nature and Concept that allows him to distance himself from all those natu-
ralists and philosophers who indeed (like Goethe) took into consideration the idea 
that species and other organic boundaries might not be fixed but subject to trans-
formation. With reference to Goethe’s concept of metamorphosis Hegel claims that 
only “the Concept” – and thus not Nature – is capable of developing something new. 
Suzuki shows how Hegel engages with theories of reproduction from Leibniz and 
Buffon to Schelling and develops his own theoretical account of sexual reproduc-
tion. However, through his re-articulation of metamorphosis or development as a 
philosophical-conceptual process he introduced a separation between philosophy 
and science that, in the decades that followed, became extremely powerful.
The initial idea for this topical collection goes back to the workshop “Conceiv-
ing Reproduction. The Impact of German Naturphilosophie”, organized by Susanne 
Lettow and Gregory Rupik, that took place at Freie Universität Berlin on July 6–7, 
2018. The workshop and this publication have been funded by the German Research 
Foundation DFG as part of the research project “Genealogy and Belonging. Repro-
duction, Descent and Kinship in Post-Kantian Naturphilosophie”. I thank the anony-
mous reviewers of this project as well as the reviewers who have contributed to this 
topical collection for their support. Special thanks go to Gregory Rupik for co-edit-
ing the topical collection and to Florence Vienne for comments on an early draft of 
this introduction.
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